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In the last ten years, ownership of an underground storage
tank (UST) used for the storage of materials which might
threaten human health or the environment has become a source of
substantial liability. Until recently, the duties associated with
owning a UST have been largely a product of the common law
and the statutory and regulatory laws associated with human
safety and fire prevention. Now, however, the modern concern for
human safety includes the safety associated with a healthy envi-
ronment. Thus, laws have evolved to promote concern for the envi-
ronment. The newly created consequences of owning a UST have
justified greater consideration of the question of how one resolves
the "ownership" issue.
This article will highlight some of the reasons why ownership
of a UST is unattractive as well as certain legal considerations
which an individual or entity might consider in determining
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whether to become the owner of a UST. Rather than attempt to
provide easy answers, this article will attempt to reveal those ar-
eas of the law which provide the greatest guidance by focusing on
USTs used to store petroleum and its distillates.1 This article does
not address issues associated with the language of the regulatory
definition of the term "owner."
B. History of Underground Storage Tanks
The petroleum UST is a creature of demand for readily ac-
cessible retail gasoline in large quantities. Horseless motoring was
in its infancy at the turn of the century and the demand for drive-
in gasoline was very small. It was not until mass production of the
automobile that the demand for retail gasoline increased.
The modern "service station" as we know it developed during
the first quarter of the twentieth century. Before the turn of the
century, motorists filled their automobile at bulk depots with hand
held pitchers.2 Gasoline was stored at these depots in five-gallon
containers.3 The method for fueling automobiles became a little
more convenient as bulk dealers switched to gravity fed hose
transfer systems attached to aboveground bulk storage units. This
method prevailed until the invention of the gasoline pump.
Advancement in gasoline-pump technology in the second dec-
ade of the twentieth century by manufacturers such as Tokheim
Oil Tank & Pump Company and Gilbert and Barker Company
(Gilbarco) caused a rapid expansion of retail facilities with under-
ground storage tanks.
As more of these modern pump units appeared on the market,
gasoline storage went permanently underground, simplifying the
curbside positioning of gasoline pumps in urban settings. Safety
improved too.'
For example, in California, 8C0% of the USTs contain petroleum products. John J.
Hill, A State's Perspective of the Problems Associated with Petroleum Contaminated
Soils, in I PETROLEUM CONTAMINATED SoILs 22 (Paul T. Kostecki & John J. Calabrese
eds., 1989).
' MICHAEL KARL WITZEL, THE AMERICAN GAS STATION: HISTORY AND FOLKLORE
OF THE GAS STATION IN AMERICAN CAR CULTURE 13 (1992).
1 Id.; see generally CHEVRON, ONE HUNDRED YEARS HELPING TO CREATE THE FU-
TURE 1879-1979: STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (1979).
4 CHEVRON, supra note 3, at 32-33.
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So began the era of the retail sale of petroleum from USTs and
their regulation.'
During the second quarter of the twentieth century, retail fa-
cilities with USTs grew at a rapid pace. This growth was facili-
tated by dealership arrangements. By creating a dealer relation-
ship, the oil companies did not have to commit capital to real
estate or buildings. Grocery stores, lumber yards, hardware stores,
and other retail establishments could install, or as was frequently
the case, have the oil company install, tanks and pumps. These
mixed-use dealer facilities were in addition to the free-standing
retail dealer facilities being developed by the oil refining
companies.
The number of retail petroleum marketing facilities peaked
in 1939 with almost 250,000 facilities. One author suggests that
retail gasoline dealerships offered an inexpensive way to be self-
employed and, thus, flourished even during the great depression.'
As competition developed, brand identification became more im-
portant. With trademarks came customer loyalty. However, most
oil companies did not solely rely on their trademark to insure con-
trol of brand identification. 7 Many oil refiners used ownership of
distribution equipment, including underground storage tanks, to
control their branded fuels and trademarks. This approach re-
sulted in the development of distribution agreements." Those
agreements generally provided that the oil company retained own-
' The first regulations were from municipalities. Fire and building departments called
for inspection of facilities and permits prior to construction. Early concerns were with the
explosive hazards inherent in handling a combustible liquid and aesthetic design. Finkler,
History of Service Station and Gasoline Marketing, in THE DESIGN, REGULATION, AND
LOCATION OF SERVICE STATIONS 5-6 (July-Aug. 1973).
6 Shelley Bookspan, Tanks, But No Tanks, 19 REAL EST. LJ. 254, 256 (1991). The
history of petroleum marketing provides an interesting insight into the economic develop-
ment of the United States. The ebb and flow in the number of stations and their diverse
architecture provide some insights. Expansion in the number of outlets in the thirties was
followed by a decline in the forties. Similarly, the growth in the number of retail facilities
in the seventies is giving way to a decline in the nineties. The EPA has suggested, as have
others, that the number of rural stations could fall by 50% by the end of the decade, and
with it a unique visage along many rural, two-lane highways where former stations and
their architecture are still visible, id.
7 For instance, the Lanham Act protects trademarks and is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1055 - 1127 (1992). The Lanham Act provides civil liability for any person who, in
commerce, uses any imitation of a registered trademark, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1993).
1 Distribution relationships invoke the jurisdiction of the Petroleum Marketing Prac-
tices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801 - 2841 (1993). The PMPA (a legislative creature
born in the era of the Arab embargo, gas lines and unusual market forces) regulates the
relationship between a franchiser oil company or distributor/retailer. While not directly
1993-94]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
ership of the underground storage tanks, but allowed the risks as-
sociated with the individual facility to remain with the retailer. 9
As the retail gasoline market matured, the retail facilities be-
came commodities. Oil companies traded locations in order to en-
hance distribution economies. The shorter the haul, the less cost to
the market. To facilitate the trading, a standard pricing guide was
developed to establish uniform pricing of equipment upon sale or
trade with another oil company.10 With the ease of trading, retail
marketing outlets traded hands faster than a common baseball
card. This trading confused underground storage tank ownership,
as did the closing of these facilities.
II. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH "OWNERSHIP"
A. Civil Liability
Not all liability which results from the utilization of UST
systems is the result of UST system installation or maintenance.
relevant to the ownership of USTs, the PMPA is one additional aspect of the regulation
facing petroleum marketers.
I A 1974 Gulf Oil Corporation Memorandum Agreement contained the following
provisions:
That the [purchaser of petroleum products ("purchaser")] is the owner or
lessee of the premises above referred to; if lessee, that he has a valid and
subsisting lease for said premises . . . and that he will procure the written
consent of the owner of said premises to the installation of the equipment
above mentioned, which consent shall provide that the equipment of [Gulf
stored or installed upon said premises shall be exempt from levy, sale or dis-
tress for rent, and that upon the termination of this contract, [Gulf] shall
have the unrestricted right to enter upon said premises and to remove any
and all of its property therefrom.
... It is expressly understood and agreed that the title to said equipment
shall at all times remain in [Gulf], and that in no event shall such equipment
be considered a part of the real estate ....
[Purchaser] shall indemnify and save harmless [Gulf] of and from any
and all liability for loss, damage, injury or other casualty to persons or prop-
erty, caused or occasioned by any leakage, fire or explosion of petroleum
products stored in or dispensed from said equipment, or in any way growing
out of or resulting from the installation and operation of said equipment,
whether the same results from negligence or otherwise.
Memorandum of Agreement between Gulf Oil Corporation and Ladra Agrabrite (May 7,
1974) (on file with the Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law) [hereinafter
Gulf Oil Memo].
10 The authors were unable to obtain a copy of the standard pricing guide, but many
oil marketing "old timers" confirmed in interviews that such a guide once existed. The
standard pricing guide was to retail distribution facilities as Becketts is to baseball cards or
the NADA "Blue Book" is to automobiles.
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Accordingly, practitioners should be mindful that not all liability
associated with the storage of petroleum and its distillates is at-
tributable to the ownership of the USTs. In addition to the liabil-
ity which is associated with the ownership of UST systems is the
liability associated with the operation of those systems.' Thus, li-
ability analysis should begin with determining whether the liabil-
ity arises from ownership or operation.
Liability for property damage associated with the storage of
petroleum or other flammable liquids is not a recent development.
Prior to the advent of regulation, the common law had found theo-
ries under which owners of property upon which such substances
were stored could be held accountable to their neighbors for prop-
erty damages.11  The most common theories under which one
11 This liability is made clear from a simple reading of the regulations applicable to
UST systems. These regulations impose responsibility upon both owners and operators of
USTs. For example, operators are responsible for compliance with the following
regulations:
40 C.F.R. § 280.20 (1992), Performance standards for new UST systems; 40 C.F.R.
§ 280.30 (1992), Spill and overfill control; 40 C.F.R. § 280.31 (1992), Operation and
maintenance of corrosion protection; 40 C.F.R. § 280.32 (1992), Compatibility; 40 C.F.R.
§ 280.33 (1992), Repairs allowed; 40 C.F.R. § 280.34 (1992), Reporting and record keep-
ing; 40 C.F.R. § 280.40 (1992), General requirements for all UST systems; 40 C.F.R.
§ 280.41 (1992), Requirements for petroleum UST systems; 40 C.F.R. § 280.42 (1992),
Requirements for hazardous substance UST systems; 40 C.F.R. § 280.45 (1992), Release
detection record keeping; 40 C.F.R. § 280.50 (1992), Reporting of suspected releases; 40
C.F.R. § 280.51 (1992), Investigation due to off-site impacts; 40 C.F.R. § 280.52 (1992),
Release investigation and confirmation steps; 40 C.F.R. § 280.53 (1992), Reporting and
cleanup of spills and overfills; 40 C.F.R. § 280.60 (1992), General; 40 C.F.R. § 280.61
(1992), Initial response; 40 C.F.R. § 280.62 (1992), Initial abatement measures and site
check; 40 C.F.R. § 280.63 (1992), Initial site characterization; 40 C.F.R. § 280.64
(1992), Free product removal; 40 C.F.R. § 280.65 (1992), Investigations for soil and
groundwater cleanup; 40 C.F.R. § 280.66 (1992), Corrective action plan; 40 C.F.R.
§ 280.67 (1992), Public participation; 40 C.F.R. § 280.70 (1992), Temporary closure; 40
C.F.R. § 280.71 (1992), Permanent closure and changes-in-service; 40 C.F.R. § 280.72
(1992), Assessing the site at closure or change-in-service; 40 C.F.R. § 280.73 (1992), Ap-
plicability to previously closed UST systems; 40 C.F.R. § 280.74 (1992), Closure records;
In addition, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in its Automotive and
Marine Service Code imposes a requirement that "[a]ccurate daily inventory records shall
be maintained and reconciled on all Class I liquid and diesel fuel storage tanks for indica-
tion of possible leakage." NFPA 30, AUTOMOTIVE & MARINE SERVICE CODE, ch. 2, § 1.5
(1990). NFPA 30A devotes its Chapter 9 to "Operational Requirements" and describes
the requirements for attendance or supervision of dispensing operations and prohibits dis-
pensing of Class I liquids into nonmetallic or unapproved portable containers, among other
things. NFPA 30A, AUTOMOTIVE & MARINE SERVICE CODE, ch. 9, § 2 (1990).
'2 See Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co., 12 S.W. 937 (Ky. 1890) (declaring liability for
damages to a spring adjacent to a warehouse at which coal oil was stored). Although the
theory of liability is not clearly defined by the text of the case, the court cited the "familiar
doctrine that one must so use his property as not to injure his neighbor, and .. .the owner
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might bring a complaint for damages caused by contamination
from leaking contents of UST's are as follows. 3
1. Trespass
Liability for trespass because of leakage or seepage of UST
contents requires more than mere proof that the contents have mi-
grated from the UST to the property of the claimant. In Snyder v.
Jessie,'4 the court affirmed the dismissal of a trespass claim on the
theory that the defendant, a home heating oil supplier, lacked
"the requisite willful intent to intrude upon [the] plaintiff's prop-
erty."' 5 The defendant in the case was not alleged to be the owner
of the tank. The defendant was instead the supplier of home heat-
ing oil to a mentally-impaired customer who ordinarily required
only two hundred gallons of fuel per season. In one season, how-
ever, the heating oil supplier added approximately one thousand
gallons of fuel oil to the tank in a two-month period." This case
and other trespass cases have focused on the intent element of
trespass.7
2. Nuisance
In Great Northern Refining Co. v. Lutes,t6 strict rules were
made applicable to those who brought petroleum on to their own
property. The court there stated that
[e]very one who brings or stores oil on his land must confine it
securely in pipes, tanks, or reservoirs, or at least not permit it to
escape onto the land of another, whether by flowing over the
surface or percolating through the soil, and if he do [sic] not,
even though guilty of no negligence, he will be liable for
whatever damage is suffered by the oil escaping.' 9
(of lands through which subterranean waters pass] has no right to poison [the subterranean
water], however innocently, or to contaminate it, so that when it reaches his neighbor's
land it is in such condition as to be unfit for use either by man or beast." Id. at 938; see
also Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. RY. Co. v. Gillispie, 113 S.W. 89 (Ky. 1908).
"a See William B. Johnson, Annotation, Tort Liability for Pollution from Under-
ground Storage Tank, 5 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1991).
" Snyder v. Jessie, 565 N.Y.S.2d 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
15 Id. at 929.
10 Id. at 925.
17 Id.




The Great Northern Court further indicated that "where the air is
corrupted by noisome smells so as to substantially interfere with
the ordinary comforts of human existence, or to materially dimin-
ish the value of another's property, such smells constitute a
nuisance."2
In Standard Oil v. Bentley,"t the court indicated that "a law-
ful business cannot be a nuisance per se, but the manner in which
it is conducted may be such as to create a nuisance." The court
declined to hold that the operative gasoline storage plant was a
nuisance per se.12 The claim of nuisance in Kentucky is now gov-
erned by statute.23
3. Negligence
The theory of negligence associated with the ownership and
operation of USTs is particularly interesting because of the regu-
lated environment in which the UST is found. Due to the preva-
lence of regulation, the owner, operator, or both are likely to face
complaints based on theories of negligence in which the standard
or duty of care is codified in some form. 4 At least two cases in
Kentucky have dealt with the failure to observe a statutory duty
in the context of negligence claims.
In Home Insurance Co. v. Hamilton,5 the district court con-
sidered a defendant's violation of a regulation promulgated pursu-
ant to section 227.300 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes which
prohibited gasoline from being "stored or handled within any ser-
vice station building except packaged items.' 26 This violation was
considered to be negligence per se and the basis for partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 7
Twenty years later, the district court in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Stokes Oil Co. concluded that the failure to observe the
requirements of the National Fire Protection Association Pam-
20 Id.
" Standard Oil v, Bentley, 84 S.W.2d 20, 20 (Ky. 1935).
22 Id.
" Ky. REv. STAT" ANN. § 411.500-.570 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) [hereinafter
KRS]; see John S. Palmore, Kentucky's New Nuisance Statute, 7 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y 1
(1991-92).
24 See supra notes 8, 11 and infra notes 17, 25, 28, 30, 32 and accompanying text for
discussion of the regulations applicable to USTs.
1, Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752, 755 (E.D. Ky. 1966).
26 Id.
" Id. at 756.
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phlet 30 (NFPA 30) "Flammable and Combustible Liquids
Code" was presumed to be the cause of a fire unless proved other-
wise." During the unloading of a barge at a terminal facility, one
of the tanks was overfilled."a NFPA 30 required the tank to be
gauged frequently while it was being filled and to be equipped
with a bell that rang as the tank neared being full."0 On appeal,
the decision of the district court, which had apportioned liability
on account of the failure to observe NFPA 30, was affirmed."1
4. Ultrahazardous Activity
Some courts have been willing to hold that the storage of gas-
oline is an ultrahazardous activity. However, most jurisdictions
have concluded that the storage of gasoline is not an ul-
trahazardous activity.
B. Compliance Liability and Sources of Regulation
USTs have a disjointed and confusing regulatory scheme be-
cause the installation, use, and operation of USTs and the disposal
of their contents are separately governed by different agencies or
branches of agencies.
1. Fire Marshall Regulations
First in the regulatory scheme is the State Fire Marshall.32 In
fact, the State Fire Marshall has been regulating gasoline storage
tanks for many years. 33 A permit from the State Fire Marshall is
currently required for any changes in construction, remodeling or
operation of a refinery, bulk storage plant, distributing station,
service station, or airport not under jurisdiction of the Kentucky
Building Code. 4 Thus, the regulations of the State Fire Marshall
govern the installation, modification and removal of petroleum
28 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stokes Oil Co., 639 F. Supp. 291, 297 (W.D. Ky. 1986).
29 Id. at 296.
30 Id. at 297.
1 Phillips Petroleum Company v. Stokes Oil Co., 863 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1988).
82 See KRS § 227.300 (Baldwin 1993) and 815 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 10:040, § 15(c)
(1993) [hereinafter KAR]; see also 815 KAR 10:045 (1993) (incorporating NFPA 30A,
AUTOMOTIVE & MARINE SERVICE CODE (1990)).
" See Glenmore Distilleries v. Fiorella, 117 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1938) (describing the
effects of a plaintiff acquiring "a permit to erect tanks according to adopted standards").
11 See KRS § 224.60-105(4)(a) (Baldwin 1993) (authorizing cabinet to regulate
USTs and preempt laws except existing fire marshal regulations).
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USTs. For obvious reasons, these operations can involve signifi-
cant fire or explosion hazards. The State Fire Marshall has
adopted national standards of safety promulgated by the National
Fire Protection Association. 5
2. Underground Storage Tank Regulations
The major scheme of regulations applicable to USTs was
drafted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) following the passage of the 1984 amendments to the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).3 ' These regula-
tions became effective December 22, 1988. Through a Memoran-
dum of Agreement between the Underground Storage Tank
Section of the Kentucky Department for Environmental Protec-
tion and the Underground Storage Section and Water Manage-
ment Division of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Kentucky assumed responsibility for the implementation
of title 40, section 280 of the Code of Federal Regulations for the
period beginning December 22, 1988 and ending when Kentucky
received interim or final program approval in accordance with title
40, section 281 of the Code of Federal Regulations.37 Final pro-
gram approval has not yet been obtained. The General Assembly
approved legislation requiring the registration of underground
storage tanks, requiring the NREPC to regulate USTs, and stat-
ing that the intent of the General Assembly was that the NREPC
"establish a program to regulate [USTs] which implements fed-
eral regulatory requirements for [USTs]."' 8
USTs must be operated in conformity with the regulations
promulgated pursuant to RCRA. These regulations are more com-
monly known as "the underground storage tank regulations."'s 9
Glenmore Distilleries, 117 S.W.2d 173.
42 U.S.C. § 6991-6992 (1993) provided the framework for the federal legislative
response to the problems associated with underground storage tanks. These statutes, among
other things, provided definitions and exemptions, 42 U.S.C. § 6991; required notification
by owners of the existence of USTs, 42 U.S.C. § 6991a; required the promulgation of
regulations regarding release detection, prevention, reporting and corrective action, 42
U.S.C. § 6991b; and provided for the approval of state programs for UST release detec-
tion, prevention and correction, 42 U.S.C. § 6991c. The regulations are located at 40
C.F.R. pt. 280 (1992).
" Memorandum of Agreement, 93 TANK FUND NEWS. Mar. 1993, at 2. Such ap-
proval has not yet been received, id.
38 See KRS § 224.824 (Baldwin 1993).
31 See Bookspan, supra note 6; Heidi E. Brieger, LUST and the Commom Law: A
Marriage of Necessity, 13 B.C. ENVIL. AFF L. REv. 521 (1986); Geoffrey Commons,
1993-94]
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Kentucky, rather than attempt to create an entirely new set of
regulations, has incorporated the EPA's regulations in an unal-
tered form."' These regulations are administered by the Kentucky
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet's
(KNREPC) Underground Storage Tank Branch (UST Branch). "
These regulations created the standards and certain specific duties
applicable to owners and operators. Very few of these obligations
are specifically assigned by the language of the regulations to ei-
Plugging the Leak in Underground Storage Tanks: The 1984 RCRA Amendments, I I VT.
L. REV. 267 (1986); Blaine D. Edwards, LUST-Deep in the Heart of Texas: Federal
EPA Regulations Affecting Underground Storage Tanks-the Texas Statutory and Regu-
latory Counterparts, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 401 (1989); Thurman A. Gardner, Jr., Under-
ground Storage Tanks: A Lawyer's Guide to Recent Federal and North Carolina Legisla-
tion, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 447 (1990); Candace C. Gauthier, The Enforcement of
Federal Underground Storage Tank Regulations, 20 ENVTL. L 261 (1989); Glenn Wad-
dell, A Practitioner's Guide to the Recently Promulgated UST Regulations, 41 ALA. L.
REV. 487 (1990).
40 See 401 KAR 42:011 (1993), incorporating the applicability, definitions and in-
terim prohibition requirements of 40 C.F.R. pt. 280, subpt. A (1992); 401 KAR 42:020
(1993), incorporating the performance standards, notification, and alternatives for upgrad-
ing requirements of 40 C.F.R. pt. 280, subpt. B (1990); 401 KAR 42:030 (1993), incorpo-
rating the spill and overfill control, operation and maintenance of corrosion protection,
compatibility, repairs, reporting and record-keeping requirements of 40 C.F.R. pt. 280,
subpt. C (1992); 401 KAR 42:040 (1993), incorporating the release detection and record-
keeping requirements of 40 C.F.R. pt. 280, subpt. D (1992); 401 KAR 42:050 (1993),
incorporating the requirements for reporting of suspected releases and investigation of off-
site impacts of 40 C.F.R. pt. 280, subpt. E (1992); 401 KAR 42:060 (1993). incorporating
the requirements for release response, site characterization, corrective action and public
participation of 40 C.F.R. pt. 280, subpt. F (1992); 401 KAR 42:070 (1993), incorporating
the out-of-service and closure requirements of 40 C.F.R. pt. 280, subpt. G (1992); 401
KAR 42:080 (1993), incorporating the financial responsibility requirements of 40 C.F.R.
pt. 280, subpt. H (1992).
41 The address of the Petroleum Storage Tank Environmental Assurance Fund Com-
mission is 911 Leawood Drive, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601.
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ther one or the other of these parties. 2 Thus, these regulations
magnify the hazards of owning USTs.
3. Hazardous Waste Regulations
The owner and operator of petroleum USTs will very likely
be confronted with Kentucky's hazardous waste regulations. The
owner or operator will at least confront these regulations at the
time when the USTs are being removed from the ground or are in
"corrective action." '44 Clearly, an examination of the hazardous
and solid waste regulations would be beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. However, the consequences of falling within the definition of a
hazardous waste are numerous and include the following: a waste
42 See letter from Leah MacSwords, Manager, ENFORCEMENT BRANCH, DIVISION OF
WASTE MGMT.. NAT. RESOURCES AND ENVTL. PROTECTION CABINET, to Gary W. Napier
(Jan. 26, 1993) (on file with the Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental
Law)(advising that the NREPC "holds both the owner and operator jointly and severally
liable for all aspects of an underground storage tank"); letter from Mr. Jim McCormick,
Director, POLICY AND STANDARDS DIVISION. UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS, to Mr. Elmer Street, Owner of un-
derground storage tanks (undated) (on file with the Journal of Natural Resources & Envi-
ronmental Law) (advising that "[t]he regulations hold both the owner and operator of [a]
UST liable" and further advising that the EPA could hold the owner, lessor and sublessor
responsible for assuring compliance with the closure regulations); letter from Ms. Kirsten
Engel, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, to Mr. Alan Campbell, Dow, Lohnes & Albertson (Jan. 19, 1990) (on file with
the Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law) (advising that "[w]hile it may
be easier for the operator of an UST to comply with the [reporting and record keeping]
requirements, the regulations do not distinguish between owners and operators and thus do
not establish that the operator is 'primarily responsible' for ensuring compliance with these
provisions." This letter further advises that "nothing in the language of the regulation
would suggest ... that compliance with the notification requirement is 'primarily' the re-
sponsibility of the UST operator" and that the "regulations do not provide that the owner
will be held 'primarily' responsible for complying with [the upgrading] requirement[s]" of
40 C.F.R. § 280.21 (1992)).
13 In addition to creating a compliance duty, these regulations might establish mini-
mum standards of care from a negligence standpoint under the logic of Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Stokes Oil Co., 639 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. Ky. 1986), aft'd, 863 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir.
1988) and Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Ky. 1966). Without sug-
gesting the outcome of the analysis, the relevant inquiries would be whether the regulation
was enacted for safety purposes and not just for governmental convenience; whether the
injury sustained must be one that the statute was enacted to prevent; whether the injury
was sustained by a person or by a property interest which the statute or ordinance contem-
plated protecting; and finally, whether the violation of the statute was the proximate cause
of the injury. Home Ins. Co., 253 F. Supp. at 755.
" The term "corrective action" is derived from the federal underground storage tank
regulations. Following a suspected release, an owner or operator may be required to submit
a "corrective action plan." 40 C.F.R. pt. 280, subpt. F. For a description of the mechanics
of a "corrective action plan," see Gauthier, supra note 39, at 272.
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
determination must be made;"5 the generator of the hazardous
waste must register as such prior to treating, storing, disposing,
transporting or offering the hazardous waste for transportation;"
hazardous waste must be manifested before being transported or
offered for transportation;' the hazardous waste must be pack-
aged, labeled, marked and placarded in accordance with the regu-
lations of the United States Department of Transportation before
being transported; 8 the transporter of the hazardous waste must
have an EPA identification number;49 and the hazardous waste
must only be disposed of at disposal facilities which have an EPA
identification number.5"
Fortunately, the hazardous waste regulations provide limited
relief from their application in the form of an exemption from the
definition of "hazardous waste" for "[pletroleum-contaminated
media and debris that fail the test for the toxicity characteristics
of title 401, section 31:030 of the Kentucky Administrative Regu-
lations (hazardous waste codes D018 through D043 only) and are
subject to the corrective action regulations under title 401, chap-
ter 42 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations."51 This exclu-
sion is very important. Failure to treat the wastes at an UST site
consistently with this exclusion can cause owners and operators to
run afoul of the hazardous waste regulations.
If the waste is the subject of a "corrective action plan" and
would only be classified as "hazardous" because it fails a TCLP
analysis for benzene, then the waste is not a hazardous waste
under the exclusion. Such wastes remain subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the UST Branch. If the waste fails the TCLP analysis for
lead (hazardous waste number D008), is not the subject of a cor-
rective action plan, or exhibits hazardous characteristics other
than toxicity5", it is still a hazardous waste notwithstanding the
petroleum UST exclusion.5 3 Thus, most UST sites which are in
" 401 KAR 32:010, § 2 (1992).
,0 401 KAR 32:010, § 3.
" 401 KAR 32:020 (1992).
S 401 KAR 32:030 (1992).
' 401 KAR 32:010, § 3(3); 401 KAR 33:010, § 2 (1992).
401 KAR 32:010, § 3(3).
6 401 KAR 31:010, § 4(2)0) (1992).
02 401 KAR 31.030, §§ 2-4 (1992).
" See Notice from Caroline P. Haight, Director, DIVISION OF WASTE MANAGEMENT.
NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVTL. PROTECTION CABINET. KENTUCKY DEPT. FOR ENVTL,
PROTECTION, to Underground Storage Tank Owners, Contractors, and Landfill Operators
(Jan. 19, 1993)(on file with the Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law).
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"corrective action" will have some materials which are hazardous
wastes and some wastes which would be hazardous wastes but for
the special petroleum-contaminated media and debris exclusion."
In construing the exception, it should be remembered that the
terms "petroleum-contaminated media" and "debris" are not as
broad as they might appear. The terms have been interpreted to
include only the media and debris found outside a UST rather
than inside.5" The NREPC's interpretation of the terms are best
exhibited by the closure guidelines issued by the NREPC's UST
Branch."'
4. Division of Water Regulations
The NREPC's Division of Water administers the Kentucky
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (KPDES). 57 This system
is based on the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA) which provides
that "[e]xcept as in compliance with [33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312,
1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344] the discharge of any pollutant
by any person shall be unlawful." 58 Thus, the provisions of the
CWA are not invoked until the instant of discharge.
The NREPC may issue federal permits pursuant to the
CWA.59 The KPDES is responsible for issuing, modifying, revok-
ing, reissuing, terminating, monitoring and enforcing discharge
permits.6" The KPDES program requires permits for the dis-
" See infra note 56 (discussing different types of material found at a UST site).
6 55 Fed. Reg. 11,798 (1990) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 261, 264, 265, 268,
271, 302).
,6 Sludge, cleaning material(s), as well as any water accumulated in the tank
are subject to a hazardous waste determination in accordance with 401 KAR
Chapters 31 and 32. This includes Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Proce-
dure (TCLP) testing . . . and flash point to determine if the materials are a
hazardous waste. Sludge, cleaning material(s) as well as any water accumu-
lated in the tank that have not had a hazardous waste determination or are
determined to be a hazardous waste must be removed from the site by a
registered hazardous waste hauler for transportation to a permitted hazard-
ous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility.
DIVISION OF WASTE MANAGEMENT. NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVTL. PROTECTION CABI-
NET. KENTUCKY DEFT. FOR ENVTL. PROTECTION. UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK SYS-
TEMS(S) CLOSURE OUTLINE FOR COLLECTION OF SAMPLES AND LABORATORY ANALYSIS
FOR UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK SYSTEM(S) IN KENTUCKY (1992) (on file with the
Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law)(emphasis added).
See KRS § 224.10-110 (Baldwin 1993); 401 KAR 5:050 (1993).
'. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
" KRS § 224.16-050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
' 401 KAR 5:050, § 1(23) (1992).
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charge of pollutants from any point source into the waters of the
Commonwealth.6 The regulations, therefore, become important
where the contents of a UST have escaped into the waters of the
Commonwealth from a "point source."82 These regulations are
also important when the corrective action plan for a UST site in-
cludes a groundwater treatment system with an effluent discharge
into the waters of the Commonwealth.6" In these cases, a KPDES
permit must be obtained prior to discharge in order to comply
with the law."4
5. Air Quality Regulations
In some instances, "corrective action" will involve the use of
air stripper technology to remove the volatile organic compounds
from the contaminated water and wastewater."5 Air stripper tech-
nology most typically involves an emission of an air contaminant
into the outdoor atmosphere. As a result, air stripper treatment of
petroleum-contaminated media and debris requires a construction
permit prior to construction, reconstruction or modification of a
source and also requires registration as an operator of a source. 66
6. Kentucky Petroleum Storage Tank Environmental Assurance
Fund
In 1990, the Kentucky General Assembly created the Ken-
tucky Petroleum Storage Tank Environmental Assurance Fund
Commission (KPSTEAF Commission).17 Among other things, the
KPSTEAF Commission was authorized to "[elstablish criteria to
be met by a petroleum storage tank owner or operator to be eligi-
" 401 KAR 5:055, § 1 (1992).
" A "point source" is "any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, vessel, or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged [except for] return flows from irrigated agricul-
ture." 401 KAR 5:050, § 1(34) (1993).
63 For an enlightening discussion of treatment technologies available for petroleum
contamination for a UST, particularly where groundwater contamination is present, see
Gauthier, supra note 39, at 272-76.
" See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, MODEL NPDES PERMIT FOR Dis-
CHARGES RESULTING FROM THE CLEANUP OF GASOLINE RELEASED FROM UNDERGROUND
STORAGE TANKS (1989).
See id. at § 4.2.1 (discussing air stripper technology).
e 401 KAR 50:010, :030, :035 (1993).
e, 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 370, § 5.
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ble to participate in the [Petroleum Storage Tank Environmental
Assurance Fund] and receive reimbursement from the fund."'68
The KPSTEAF Commission is "attached to the [NREPC] for ad-
ministrative purposes." 6 9
Although not a "regulatory" agency, the regulations promul-
gated by the KPSTEAF Commission are as important as those of
any agency because these regulations relate to whether monies in
the KPSTEAF will assist owners or operators with the costs of the
remediation of any contamination at a UST facility. In general
terms, these regulations provide the guidelines for remaining eligi-
ble for assistance from the KPSTEAF.
7 0
7. Local Ordinances
Finally, for those who are concerned that the foregoing layers
of regulation will not suffice, there is solace in the fact that a local
government entity might regulate the USTs themselves or the
materials within the UST, the remediation of the environment for
release of these materials, the emergency response to releases or
threatened releases, and the discharge of waters into the munici-
pal storm or sanitary sewer systems.
7 1
III. THE "OWNERSHIP" PROBLEM
The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to show that
there are significant risks associated with the ownership of a UST.
Unfortunately, in many cases, it may not be clear whether one is
or is not the owner of a UST. The fundamental problem associ-
ated with determining whether one is an owner under the UST
regulations is that the term "owner" is not defined by these regu-
lations. The definition of "owner" under title 40, section 280.10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations, which is made applicable in
Kentucky by the provisions of title 401, section 42:011 of the Ken-
tucky Administrative Regulations, includes any person who
"owns" a UST system in use or brought one into use on or after
November 8, 1984 and, for UST systems no longer in use on No-
vember 8, 1984, any person who "owned" such UST system im-
6 KRS § 224.60-130(2)(b) (Michic/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
KRS § 224.60-130(2)(g).
415 KAR 1:040 (1993).
7 LEXINGTON - FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY. Ky., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16 (1993).
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mediately before the discontinuation of its use." Thus, the defini-
tion of the term "owner" is rather circuitously drafted, utilizing
the terms "owns" and "owned" without defining either of those
terms."3
Upon the issuance of the UST regulations, UST owners sud-
denly became subject to a notification requirement.74 Following a
history of regulatory disinterest regarding the ownership of
USTs-in fact, history had allowed the subject of ownership to
remain relatively ignored-the issue was suddenly thrust into the
forefront of regulating an industry. Likewise, it was thrust into
the forefront of the concerns of the regulated industry.
Prior to the promulgation of these regulations, there had been
no registration requirement for the ownership of USTs. In addi-
tion, the ownership of the USTs was not required to be recorded
in writing by any substantive law. In essence, the documentation
of ownership of a UST was left to the caprice of private parties.
To further complicate the issue of ownership of a UST, the petro-
leum industry has historically been marked by frequent and nu-
merous mergers and other transactions in which large numbers of
gasoline retail facilities changed hands. The industry has likewise
engaged in frequent transfers of individual gasoline retail facili-
ties. The documentation of both types of transfers from the stand-
point of individual gasoline retail facilities was scanty in most in-
stances. In combination, these two industry characteristics mean
that the ownership history of the great majority of gasoline retail
facilities is at best documented by a series of recorded deeds and
largely unavailable documents regarding long-forgotten mergers,
acquisitions and divestitures. Determining the ownership of USTs,
other than the ownership interest which is discernable by inspec-
tion of recorded deeds, is in most instances purely an exercise in
speculation and conjecture. In short, there is usually little or no
documentation from which one can clearly determine the owner-
ship of a UST.
11 This definition is consistent with the statutory definition of the term "owner." 42
U.S.C. § 6991(3) (1988). This article does not address issues associated with the language
of the regulatory definition of "ownership."
"' This same failure was not present for the definition of the term "operator." The
definition of that term is clear. An operator is "any person in control of, or having responsi-
bility for, the daily operation of the UST system." 40 C.F.R. § 280.12 (1992).
- 40 C.F.R. § 280.34(a)(1) (1992).
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The issue of ownership of USTs is suddenly a topic of sub-
stantial interest because of the notification requirement and be-
cause of the duties which befall an owner of a UST.7" While these
same duties are imposed upon operators of USTs, the definition of
the term "operator" under the UST regulations leaves much less
room for argument as to whether one is an operator. In addition,
the issue of whether one is an operator is not clouded by the need
to speculate on historical facts as is the determination of whether
one is an owner of a UST. Determining whether a person is "in
control of, or having responsibility for, the daily operation of [a]
UST" can be accomplished without resort to facts as ancient as
those associated with determining whether one is an owner, of a
UST. One need generally only examine contemporaneous facts in
order to decide this question. Since the promulgation of the UST
regulations, determining whether one is an owner of a UST has
become even more critical.
The use of the terms "owns" and "owned" in the definition of
the term "owner" is a repetition of the drafting utilized in the
definitions employed under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).
Within that body of law, the term "owner or operator" is defined,
among other things, as a person "owning or operating" a vessel,
onshore or offshore facility.7 6 In at least one case interpreting the
circuitous drafting of CERCLA, it was said that owner and oper-




The only logical conclusion regarding the EPA's failure to
define "ownership" in terms of the bundle of rights which will
constitute ownership for purposes of the UST regulations is that
the ownership of USTs was a question left to state law. 8 Any
attempt to redefine the ownership of existing USTs under existing
See supra note 11.
70 The statutory definition of owners and operators of onshore and offshore facilities
leaves an apparently untouched class of facilities: those in outer space. See the humorous
speculation of Judge Easterbrook in Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988).
7 Id.
78 Letter from David W. Ziegle, Acting Director, UNITED STATES ENvTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, OFFICE OF UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS, to Bob McEwen, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES (undated) (on file with the Journal of Natural Resources & Envi-
ronmental Law)(advising that states are not "constrained" by the federal definition of tank
owner).
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state law would probably be impermissible. Unfortunately, in ad-
dition to the unavailability of documentation applicable to a UST,
there is no bright-line test for determining ownership. No other
species of property is so analogous to a UST that the logic or the-
ory for determining its ownership can be borrowed. 9 Accordingly,
one must analyze the problem from several approaches in order to
find a rule applicable to USTs which is most consistent with the
established rules in other areas of the law. Otherwise, the legal
analysis for UST ownership will become an aberration in the law.
Courts may initially be reluctant to apply to USTs those
traditional legal principles applied to personal property annexed to
real property. The parties to the cases in which fixture theories
and other principles were developed and applied were usually at-
tempting to claim ownership of personal property located upon
lands owned by another rather than disclaim the ownership of the
property. With USTs, the current arguments of the parties will
probably be- the reverse of those which one might encounter with
respect to other, less burdensome property. Liabilities associated
with ownership of a UST can easily outweigh the benefits associ-
ated with ownership. However, the monetary liability associated
with noncompliance should generally develop after the USTs are
installed. 80 Accordingly, at the time of UST installation, its value
should have at least in theory exceeded the liabilities associated
with its ownership. Therefore, the rules applicable to more tradi-
tional property should also be applied to USTs.85 Those rules will
now be explored.
Ownership of personal property located upon real estate can
be separated from the ownership of the real estate itself.82 In Co-
lumbia Gas, Inc. v. Maynard, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was
faced with the proper valuation of a house which was located on
land not owned by the owner of the house. The owner of the house
did not have any rental or other kind of contract entitling him to
11 The authors have encountered one case which appears to be the factual antithesis of
the valuation of a UST: Ellis v. McCormack, 218 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. 1949). It is a case in
which a coal slack pile was found to be worthless at the time it was abandoned. A coal
strike later made it valuable.
80 These liabilities are created in two ways: for tanks installed prior to the advent of
regulation, the regulations themselves create an additional cost; for all tanks, the passage of
time increases the risk of a release due to a malfunction.
"' For instance, in Standard Oil v. Dolgin, 115 A. 235 (Vt. 1921) the entity which
installed the tank sought its return on a bailment theory.
82 Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Inc. v. Maynard, 532 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
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possess or to purchase the land. In what is purely dicta, the Court
noted that "[o]rdinarily, of course, a permanent structure be-
comes a part of the real estate, but in this instance, the land-
owner disclaimed any ownership interest in the building, so they
[sic] must be considered as moveable personal property.183 Unfor-
tunately, the language quoted above appears in the court's
description of the facts of the case. The court may have been
merely making an observation with respect to the transactions
generally structured by individuals rather than commenting on the
law.
A. Fixtures
Any analysis of the ownership of a UST must be cognizant of
its nature. A UST and its associated piping are items of personal
property which have been annexed to the real estate by burial. All
petroleum USTs must be covered with a minimum of two feet of
earth or one foot of earth on top of which is placed a slab of rein-
forced concrete not less than four inches thick. 4 When the USTs
are, or are likely to be, subjected to traffic, they must be protected
against damage from vehicles passing over them by at least three
feet of earth cover or eighteen inches of well-tamped earth plus
either six inches of reinforced concrete or eight inches of asphaltic
concrete.8 5 Thus, the USTs have been rather thoroughly "an-
nexed" or "attached" to the real estate upon which they are lo-
cated. The question then becomes whether the UST is a "fixture."
The general test for whether personal property is a "fixture"
is: (1)annexation to the realty, either actual or constructive;
(2)adaptation or application to the use or purpose to which that
part of the realty to which it is connected is appropriated; and
most importantly, (3)intention of the parties to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold, with title to the article in the
one owning the freehold." Fixtures are defined as "goods [which]
. . . become so related to particular real estate that an interest in
" Id. at 5. This statement might be used to support the position that a permanent
structure is considered to be a part of the real estate unless the landowner affirmatively
disclaims interest in the structure. This position only begs the question as to what is a
"permanent" structure.
" NFPA, FLAMMABLE AND COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS CODE § 2-4.2 (1990).
I d.
Tarter v. Turpin, 291 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1956).
1993-941
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
them arises under real estate law."'11 While the perfection of se-
curity interests in fixtures is governed by the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the UCC "does not prevent
creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures pursuant to real estate
law." 88 Thus, the preservation of a security interest in fixtures can
be accomplished either through the filing of a fixture filing89 or
through the filing of a mortgage.9"
1. Intent of the Parties as Evidenced by Their Efforts to Preserve
a Claim to Property
In analyzing the intent of the parties with respect to whether
the USTs were intended to be considered as "fixtures," it should
be remembered that "[p]roperty belongs ... to the person as long
as he has a right to it and the power . . . to enforce and protect
that right."91 A person claiming ownership of a UST installed on
real property owned by another would be required to show that
when the UST was installed, the intent of the parties was that
ownership of the UST was to remain with that claimant. This in-
tent is clear where the party claiming ownership of the UST has
retained those rights necessary to protect his interest.9" When the
landowner has granted the right to enter upon the property for the
purpose of removing the UST, the intent of the parties is clearly
reflected. Likewise, the failure of the parties to make provision for
this right might be indicia that the UST was intended to be a
fixture and that its ownership vested with the landowner at the
time of its installation. Although the law might imply this right,
the failure to preserve the right and the nature of the UST as a
reusable item may constitute evidence of intent.9
Two very important provisions of the UCC for purposes of
analyzing the question whether a particular transaction was in-
tended to be a fixture filing are chapter 355, sections 9-313(4)-(5)
of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Both sections provide that a
87 KRS § 355.9-313(i)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
8 KRS § 355.9-313(3).
89 KRS § 355.9-313(4).
90 KRS § 355.9-313(6).
" Messer v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 12 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929).
"A building erected on land with the privilege of removing it, must be regarded as
personalty and should be sold as personalty." Freeman's Adm'r. v. King, 7 Ky. Op. 8, 8
(1873).
11 See Gulf Oil Memo supra note 9 (specifically providing for a right of removal).
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perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflict-
ing interest of an encumbrancer or owner in certain instances.
Thus, if a party wishes to retain an interest in a UST for the
purpose of securing the "performance of an obligation," then he
must perfect that interest through a filing. Otherwise, his interest
might be subject to the risk of conflicting interests in the real es-
tate. Finally, only when the interest of the secured party "has pri-
ority over all owners and encumbrancers of the real estate" may
he remove the collateral from the real estate.04 If the UST was to
be removed from the property, the party seeking to remove the
UST would need to have taken some steps to protect his right to
remove the UST from the property. By failing to memorialize and
perfect a right to remove a UST from the real estate, an installer
of a UST runs the risk that any right of removal will be impaired
or foreclosed by either current or subsequent owners of the prop-
erty, encumbrancers of the property, or lessors of the property.
The failure to protect an ownership interest in personal property
separate from the real estate itself should be relevant where the
owner of the real estate attempts to disclaim ownership of the
UST (i.e., attempts to claim that the UST is not a fixture).
In Stephens v Carter,95 a case concluding that USTs were
fixtures, the court held that
It is a well settled principle of common law that everything
which is annexed to the freehold becomes a part of the realty.
Although ownership of the land and of the chattel is vested in
the same person, or when the owners of both concur in a com-
mon purpose, the presumption that a chattel is made part of the
land by being affixed to it may be rebutted, yet the evidence
must, as it would seem, be in writing, under the statute of
frauds, or else consist of facts and circumstances of a nature to
render writing unnecessary, by giving birth to an equity or an
equitable estoppel."
Buildings and other improvements placed upon real estate by a
lessee may be treated as moveable personal property where such
" KRS § 355.9-313(8) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992)(emphasis added).
Stephens v. Carter, 98 S.E.2d 311 (N.C. 1957).
Id. at 313 (N.C. 1957)(quoting Fleishel v. Jessup, 94 S.E.2d 308 (1956)) (emphasis
added); cf. Lee Moore Oil Company v Cleary, 245 S.E. 720, 724-25 (N.C. 1978) (distin-
guishing Stephens on the ground that dealings between the owner of personalty and the
owner of the realty, and knowledge thereof on the part of a subsequent purchaser of the
realty, may be shown by parol evidence).
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was the intention of the contracting parties and where such inten-
tion is clearly expressed in contract of the parties with reference
thereto."97 Kentucky Farm & Cattle Co. v. Williams involved an
express written agreement that farm structures, which were er-
ected by plaintiff lessee for its sole use and benefit in its farm
operation, did not enhance the value of the farm and did not be-
come part of the realty. 98
2. Intent of Parties as Evidenced by the Nature of Attachment
to Realty
In State Auto Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trautwein,9 the
court considered whether air conditioners were fixtures which
would be included in an insurance policy covering the real estate
to which they had been attached. The court concluded that the air
conditioners were fixtures. The court focused on the method
through which the air conditioners were attached to the real estate
and the difficulty of removing them without damage to the real
estate. The air conditioners were placed in openings in the wall of
each apartment in an apartment building and fastened perma-
nently by screws and rubber seals. The air conditioners "could not
be removed without considerable force and probable damage" to
the property.100 Unfortunately, the court gave no analysis to the
three-part test for determining whether an attached item was a
fixture. However, based on the analysis, it would appear that the
court was treating the nature of the attachment as an indicia of
intent.
In Bank of Shelbyville v. Hartford,101 the court indicated
that the then "modern rule" in determining whether a particular
item was a "fixture" was to examine "the character of the act by
which the structure is put into its place, the policy of the law
connected with its purpose and the intention of [the parties]." 102
In Finley v. Ford, the improvements were noted to be removable
97 Kentucky Farm & Cattle Co. v. Williams, 140 F. Supp. 449, 452 (E.D. Ky.
1956)(quoting from 27 AM. JUR. § 4 (1980)); see also Finley v. Ford, 200 S.W.2d 138
(Ky. 1947)(discussing an express oral contract for the removal of the personalty).
Kentucky Farm and Cattle Co., 140 F. Supp at 450-51.
' State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Trautwein, 414 S.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Ky. 1967).
110 Id. at 589.
01 Bank of Shelbyville v. Hartford, 104 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Ky. 1937).
20 Id. at 218 (Ky. 1937)(citations omitted)(emphasis added). This case provides an
excellent discussion of the evolution of the law of fixtures. See also Finley v. Ford, 200
S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ky. 1990).
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"without injury to the real estate."103 Thus, they were not fixtures.
A similar idea might have been driving the court's analysis in the
case of Terry & Wright v. Crick."4 In that case, the court was
considering a house which was moved by the father onto the land
of his daughter "under some family arrangement. '" 5 The court
noted, without discussion of the three-part analysis, that the
"house was situated upon and attached to the tract owned [by the
daughter] .... [The] house thereby became a part of [the daugh-
ter's] realty." '
In connection with USTs, where compliance with NFPA 30
is present, the annexation to the subject real estate is quite com-
plete where the UST has been buried and at least two feet of
earth or its equivalent has been placed over the structure.'0 1 The
removal of a UST from the subject real estate would require con-
siderable force. In fact, it would require the use of heavy equip-
ment. The removal of a UST from the subject real estate would
also involve probable damage as at least a large unfilled pit would
remain following removal.108
With USTs, there are additional aspects which make it un-
likely that removal can be undertaken without considerable partic-
ipation or at least inconvenience to the property owner. The na-
ture of the annexation includes the regulatory burdens associated
with conducting removal of petroleum USTs from the ground be-
cause removal requires the approval of the Fire Marshall,'0 9 over-
101 Finley, 200 S.W.2d at 139.
I" Terry & Wright v. Crick, 418 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1967).
I Id. at 219.
'" Id.; cf. Kentucky Farm & Cattle Co. v. Williams, 140 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Ky.
1956); Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Inc. v. Maynard, 532 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
I"2 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
108 For an interesting description of the removal of a UST from the ground, see
Northern Natural Gas v. State Board of Equalization, 443 N.W.2d 249, 257-58 (Neb.
1989). There, the court cited Stem Brothers, Inc. v. Alexandria Township, 6 N.J. Tax 537
(1984), which addressed the question of whether certain USTs were fixtures or personal
property for purposes of taxation. The court applied an "injury by removal" test, and de-
termined that USTs were personalty rather than fixtures because the USTs could be re-
moved from the realty without harming the USTs and because removal would not cause
irreparable harm to the realty. This case is limited as being an interpretation of the treat-
ment of USTs under the tax statute which it construed. Further, the Northern Natural
Gas Court was not dealing with current standards for removal of a UST from the ground.
The court indicated that in 1981, the entire process of removal and backfill could be ac-
complished in two days and would create no serious hazard or dislocation. This case was
overruled in 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991).
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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sight by the UST Branch,"1 ' and measurement for the presence of
a release where contamination is most likely to be present at the
UST site." In the event that a release is detected, a "corrective
action plan" will be required.' 12 These corrective action plans will
involve soil and groundwater sampling to determine the vertical
and horizontal extent of the contamination.113 Clearly, this process
will be invasive to the real estate upon which the UST is located
and may extend to adjacent properties as well. Thus, when a pe-
troleum UST is annexed to the real estate, its removal will be
accomplished only by the use of considerable force, probable dam-
age and the burden of substantial oversight by the regulating enti-
ties. The very permanent nature by which USTs are attached to
the real estate should be given great weight in making a determi-
nation of whether they are fixtures.
B. Trade Fixtures
Once a determination is made that a UST is a "fixture," con-
sideration should be given to the question of whether the UST is a
"trade fixture." Trade-fixture treatment is given to items of
"property which a tenant has placed on rented real estate to ad-
vance the business for which it is leased and which may, as
against the lessor, be removed at the end of the tenant's term."'1 "
The doctrine of trade fixtures is a doctrine which arises only in the
context of the landlord/tenant relationship. 1 5 In this scenario, the
law favors the tenant's right to remove the chattel.1 6 Thus, where
a tenant installs personal property on the real estate of his land-
lord, a more liberal set of rules apply to the issue of whether he
"' 40 C.F.R. § 280.71 (1992).
40 C.F.R. § 280.72(a) (1992). For additional guidance regarding sampling meth-
ods acceptable to the NREPC's UST Branch, see DIVISION OF WASTE MGMT.. NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENVTL. PROTECTION CABINET, KENTUCKY DEP'T. FOR ENVTL. PROTECTION.
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK SYSTEM(S) CLOSURE OUTLINE FOR COLLECTION OF SAM-
PLES AND LABORATORY ANALYSIS FOR UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK SYSTEM(S) IN KEN-
TUCKY (1992)(on file with the Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law).
112 40 C.F.R. § 280.66 (1992).
"' Gauthier, supra note 39, at 272.
Bank of Shelbyville v. Hartford, 104 S.W.2d 217, 218-19 (Ky. 1937).
"As between landlord and tenant, it has been said, more than in the case of any
other relation, the greatest latitude and indulgence are to be allowed in favor of the ten-
ant's claim to have particular articles considered as personal chattels rather than as part of





should be allowed to remove the personalty. But within the liberal
rules of the landlord/tenant relationship exists an even more lib-
eral set of rules regarding trade fixtures:
The reason for the rigid enforcement of the rule in the one case
and its relaxation in the other .... [is that] [w]hen fixtures are
annexed to the land by the owner, actual or potential, the pur-
pose is to enhance the value of the freehold, and to be perma-
nent. But with the tenant a different purpose is to be served [be-
cause such fixtures are] affixed for the purposes of trade, and
not merely for the better enjoyment of the premises."'
In Commonwealth v. Dowdy,' 9 Texaco had leased two USTs
to an automobile dealer for one dollar per year. These USTs were
appropriately characterized as "trade fixtures." But this holding
should not extend beyond the facts of the case.'2 Because the
cases interpreting and applying the rules applicable to trade fix-
tures are dealing with a special subset of rules, they should not be
considered the general rule of fixtures. Their application is limited
to the situation in which the relationship is a landlord/tenant rela-
tionship, and the fixtures are placed on the property by the tenant.
Under the more liberal rules applicable to trade fixtures, a
plaintiff railway company was held to have the right to remove a
depot building it had constructed on the premises. The building
was constructed for the purpose of railway trade, and plaintiff
could remove the building at any time before plaintiff ceased to
operate the railway company. 2
However, it should be noted that the right of the tenant to
remove trade fixtures can be forfeited by failure to remove the
personal property." 2 In McClelland v. Murphy, the court held
that a tenant, having a right to remove buildings at the termina-
tion of his lease, loses such right on surrendering the premises
' "There is still an exception of a broader character in respect to fixtures erected for
the purposes of trade." Id. (citation omitted).
118 Stephens v. Carter, 98 S.E.2d 311, 313 (N.C. 1957).
Commonwealth v. Dowdy, 388 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Ky. 1965).
12 This case should be read for the discussion of counsel's closing statement, in which
it was advised "the law is a ass-a idiot." Id. at 594.
"' Pennington v. Black, 88 S.W.2d 969 (Ky. 1935).
... Interests in real property cannot be abandoned. Commmonwealth Dept. of High-
ways v. Turner, 386 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1965). It should be remembered that the doctrine of
trade fixtures is a doctrine which treats the property as personalty. Thus, property which is
a trade fixture can be "abandoned."
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without removing such buildings." 3 The tenant has a "reasonable
time" following the termination of the landlord/tenant relation-
ship to remove the property. 2 ' If not, then the personal property
becomes the property of the lessor,' even where the parties had
made a provision in their written lease that the tenant could re-
move certain oil production equipment "at any time."'
26
C. Abandonment
Although real estate cannot be abandoned, 2 7 it should be
remembered that the UST is not "real estate" in the true sense
even when it acquires those characteristics of a fixture. If the logic
of the case law is applied in a consistent manner, the UST is
clearly personalty in those instances in which it is not a fixture.
Thus, a UST which is not a fixture might be abandoned. Aban-
donment generally requires two elements: (1)voluntary relinquish-
ment of possession, and (2)intent to repudiate ownership.2 8 The
intent may be inferred from the voluntary relinquishment where
the facts justify it.12 9 Further, the lapse of a long period of time
after relinquishment of possession is significant evidence of inten-
tion to abandon.13 In Ellis v. McCormack,' the abandonment of
a "worthless" coal slack pile was found where the owner of the
slack pile ceased mining operations upon the property and dis-
posed of other materials without making any mention of the slack
pile. Subsequently, when the slack pile was sold, its previous
owner was held to have abandoned the property.' 32
113 McClelland v. Murphy, 264 S.W. 733, 734-35 (Ky. 1924).
124 Bain v. Graber, 112 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Ky. 1938).
123 Id.
126 Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Stacy, 98 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Ky. 1936).
127 See supra note 122.
128 Ellis v. McCormack, 218 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Ky. 1949). It is notable that while
these two elements are required under the general rules applicable to the concept of aban-
donment, the requirements are not normally discussed in trade fixture cases. Thus, it ap-
pears that one loses its right to trade fixtures without the voluntary relinquishment and




I52 d. Ellis cites as its authority Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v. Stacy, 98




In two cases, the UST was determined to be the subject of a
bailment arrangement where the owner of the UST had retained
the right to its return. The earliest such case was Standard Oil of
New York v. Dolgin where the parties had entered into a written
lease providing that title to a tank should remain in the supplier of
petroleum. 33 After a sale of the property, the purchaser sought to
establish its title to the tank. The court, however, indicated that
the "written lease [of the tank] created . . . a bailment."' 34 The
logic of this case was cited approvingly in the case of Lee-Moore
Oil Co. v Williams.'35 Although the court in the latter case de-
scribed the two cases as "almost identical," the cases are at least
distinguishable in that Standard Oil involved a written lease with
specific provisions while Lee-Moore Oil Co. involved an oral
agreement.1"' The cases are further distinguishable on the grounds
that in Standard Oil, the tank was never intended by the parties
to be buried. The UST in Lee-Moore Oil Co., on the other hand,
was intended by the parties to be annexed to the real estate. Thus,
Lee-Moore Oil Co. can be criticized on account of its reliance
upon the logic of a case which dealt with a tank which was never
intended by the parties to be attached to the realty at all."37 In-
deed, if Lee-Moore Oil Co. was a correct recitation of the law,
then the doctrine of fixtures would be eviscerated because merely
upon the recital of an oral agreement, any personalty attached to
realty would be required to be returned to its supplier.
"I' Standard Oil of New York v. Dolgin, 115 A. 235 (Vt. 1925).
134 Id.
131 Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Cleary, 234 S.E.2d 456 (N.C. 1977).
136 Id. at 458.
117 Standard Oil of New York, 115 A. 235 adopted the view that
the annexation by a bailee to his own real estate of personal property bailed,
with or without the knowledge and consent of the bailor, does not change the
character of the property, and the bailor may recover it of the bailee's
grantee, even though the latter [is] an innocent purchaser, unless the annexa-
tion is of such a character that the identity of the chattel is thereby lost, and
it cannot be removed without substantial injury to , . . the real estate.
Standard Oil of New York, 115 A. at 236.
Not all courts adopted this reasoning. 8 AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 87 (1980). The
other view, and clearly the better view is "the bailor's knowledge of and consent to annexa-
tion in such a manner as to indicate that bailed chattel has become a fixture and under
conditions that would naturally mislead a purchaser of the realty, will estop the bailor to
assert his title against such an innocent purchaser of the realty." 8 Am JUR. 2D Bailments
§ 87 (1980). KRS § 381.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) would appear to support the
proposition that Kentucky adopts the latter view.
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E. Conveyances
A rule with respect to the ownership of a UST must be cogni-
zant of the rules applicable to deeds and the interests they convey.
Chapter 381, section 200(1) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
provides that "[e]very deed, unless an exception is made therein,
shall be construed to include all buildings and appurtenances of
every kind attached to the lands therein conveyed. ' 138 This statute
was the basis of the holding in Thomas v. Holmes."9 Holmes had
installed water pumping equipment on property adjacent to his
own property. The land upon which the well was located was later
conveyed by a deed which reserved to Holmes the right to use the
water from the well. Thomas, the owner of the adjoining tract,
thereafter removed the pumping equipment and initiated a lawsuit
in which, among other things, the ownership of the pumping
equipment was in dispute. The court was unclear as to the exact
interest asserted by Holmes to the equipment which he had in-
stalled; the label placed on the asserted interest was a "proprie-
tary interest." Whatever its nature, the court ruled that the
"equipment was a fixture and it passed with the conveyance of the
land on which the well was located." '14 In other words, Holmes
lost any claim he may have had to the equipment when the land
was sold. Holmes, even though he had installed the equipment,
"had no legal or equitable right in or to the original equipment on
the property or its continued use, or the use of substituted equip-
ment placed there by [Thomas]."'' Thus, chapter 381, section
200 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes effected a severance of any
rights Holmes may have had in the pumping equipment and a
transfer of those rights to the purchaser of the property.
In Wilkins v. Commonwealth, the court held that
a conveyance of land, in the absence of anything in the deed
indicating a contrary intention, carries with it everything prop-
erly appurtenant to-that is, essential or reasonably necessary to
the full beneficial use and enjoyment of-the property conveyed,
138 KRS § 381.200(1).
"I Thomas v. Holmes, 206 S.W.2d 969 (Ky. 1948).
140 Id.
11 Id. at 972. This interpretation of KRS 381.200 indicates that the statute has two
effects, the combination of which effect a complete transfer of ownership of any buildings
and appurtenances attached to the lands conveyed by the deed. The statute is interpreted
to (i)convey the right to use the appurtenances and (ii)to sever the right of the transferor,
and presumably any other party, to interfere with that use.
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and this principal is equally applicable to a lease of the
premises."'
This case involved the right to the use of a basement located
under the first floor of a building. The first floor was leased to the
tenant who argued that the lease of the first floor carried with it
the right to the use of the basement. Although the court enunci-
ated the above rule, it declined to hold that the use of the base-
ment was essential to the lessee's use of the first floor. Thus, the
above language is only dictum. This language raises the question
of whether the mere lease of real estate triggers the complete ap-
plication of chapter 381, section 200 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes. The case clearly indicates that a lessee has a right of use
of everything properly appurtenant to the full beneficial use and
enjoyment of the property conveyed. While not in the text of the
case, it would only seem logical that this right should exist
throughout the duration of the leasehold estate.
CONCLUSION
While there is no absolute test to determine the issue of
whether one is an "owner" of an UST, there are very useful theo-
ries which can be applied to the problem. Although few of the
theories are initially appealing because they were developed in the
scenario of valuable property, it should be remembered that until
very recent times, the liabilities associated with UST ownership
were not as significant as they have become within the last ten
years. Thus, the rules applicable to more traditional property
should be relied upon to assist in the analysis of the ownership of
USTs.
142 Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 234 S.W.2d 966, 969 (Ky. 1950)(emphasis added).
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